Constant interest rate (CIR) projections are often criticized on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the existence of a unique equilibrium in a variety of forward-looking models. This note shows how to construct CIR projections that are not subject to that criticism, using a standard New Keynesian model as a reference framework.
Introduction
Constant interest rate (CIR) projections (i.e. forecasts conditional on the assumption of an unchanged interest rate) have been for some time one of the tools used by in ‡ation targeting central banks to base their decisions and to explain the latter to the public.
1 Such projections, however, have been criticized on the grounds that they are based on an assumption about future policy that is inconsistent with the existence of unique equilibrium in a variety of forward-looking models, including the new vintage of optimizing models commonly used for monetary policy analysis. 2 An approach that has been proposed in the literature to overcome that problem consists of assuming an interest rate rule that guarantees a unique equilibrium while assuming the presence of "exogenous" shocks to the rule taking the values needed to keep the interest rate constant during the period considered. A potential problem with that rule is that the shocks the size and pattern of the shocks required to keep the interest rate constant may be implausible or hard to reconcile with the assumption of rational expectations. 3 The purpose of the present note is to illustrate, in the context of a canonical version of the New Keynesian model, how CIR projections can be computed, in a way consistent with the model, while guaranteeing a unique equilibrium and without the need to rely on exogenous policy shocks. In particular, we show how a version of a Taylor interest rate rule that has the central bank respond to both in ‡ation and output growth with coe¢ cients that satisfy a certain proportionality condition can guarantee a unique equilibrium characterized by a constant nominal rate, and can thus be the basis of CIR projections.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the basic problem of indeterminacy under an interest rate peg and discusses its consequences for CIR projections. Section 3 presents and analyzes a rule that overcomes the indeterminacy problem. Section 4 o¤ers some caveats and concluding remarks.
Constant Interest Rate Projections and the Curse of Indeterminacy
In this section we describe the nature of the problem associated with constant interest rate policies and, as a result, with the projections based on those policies. We start by brie ‡y reviewing the canonical New Keynesian model that will serve us as a reference framework.
A Baseline Model
The model is a baseline version of the New Keynesian framework used in much recent work in monetary economics. The non-policy block of the model is made up of the following two equations:
where y t denotes (log) output, i t is the short term nominal interest rate, t p t p t 1 is the rate of in ‡ation between t 1 and t (with p t denoting the log of the price level), and x t y t y n t is the output gap (i.e. the log deviation of output from its natural level y n t ). Equation (1) can be obtained by log-linearizing the representative household's Euler equation, and imposing a market clearing condition requiring that consumption equals output at all times. Equation (2) is a version of the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve, which can be derived by aggregating the price-setting decisions of monopolistically competitive …rms subject to Calvo-type constraints on the frequency of price adjustment, combined with standard assumptions on technology and labor markets. In that context, parameter corresponds to the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, is the household's discount factor (with log being the corresponding discount rate), and is a coe¢ cient which is inversely related to the degree of price rigidities. 4 We can rewrite (1) in terms of the output gap, as follows:
Henceforth we assume that (log) natural output follows a stationary AR(1) process in …rst di¤erences, i.e. y n t = y y n t 1 + " t where y 2 [0; 1) and f" t g is a white noise process. The evolution of y n t summarizes the impact of a variety of exogenous real forces impinging on the economy.
Constant Interest Rate Policies and Equilibrium Indeterminacy
Given a path for the nominal interest rate, any non-explosive solution to the system of di¤erence equations (2) and (3) constitutes an equilibrium of our model economy. Thus, one would think that a natural approach to the construction of CIR projections at any …nite horizon, as of period t (which is taken to be the period when the projection is made), would require solving for fx t+k; t+k g given a hypothetical constant interest rate path i t+k = i chosen by the monetary authority, given the sequence of forecasts for natural output growth E t f y n t+k g = k y y n t , all for k = 0; 1; 2; ::: The di¢ culty with that approach has to do with the fact that if we set the nominal interest rate equal to a constant, the system of di¤erence equations (2)-(3) has a multiplicity of solutions.
5 To see this note that if we substitute the "rule" i t+k = i into (3), we can write the equilibrium conditions from period t onward as a system
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::where Iterating forward on (4), we see that the CIR projections for the output gap and in ‡ation at a horizon k are given, as of time t, by
(5) Thus, in order for the CIR projections at any k horizon to be well de…ned, the current values of b x t and b t must be determined uniquely. But that requires that the solution to (4) exist and be unique, for which a necessary and su¢ cient condition is that the two eigenvalues of A 0 lie within the unit circle, given that both b
x t+k and b t+k are non-predetermined variables (see, e.g. Blanchard and Kahn (1980) ). 6 The following lemma shows that the previous condition is not satis…ed.
Lemma 1 Let 1 and 2 denote the eigenvalues of A 0 , where 1 2 . Both 1 and 2 are real and satisfy 0 < 1 < 1 < 2 .
Proof : see appendix.
It follows from Lemma 1 that a multiplicity of non-explosive solutions to (4) exist, implying that the equilibrium values b x t and b t are not uniquely determined. Given (5), the CIR projections E t fb x t+k g and E t fb t+k g are not uniquely determined either.
Constant Interest Rate Projections without the Curse of Indeterminacy
Consider next an interest rate rule of the form
6 Throughout the present paper the analysis is restricted to equilibria in a neighborhood of the steady state being considered. See Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001) for a critical view of that approach, and an example of global multiplicity of equilibria coexisting with local uniqueness.
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::where b i t+k i t+k i and, as before, b t+k t+k (i ). We assume is a constant coe¢ cient satisfying > 1.
7 Combining (6) with (1) we can derive the di¤erence equation:
Under our assumption that > 1 the only non-explosive solution to (7) is b i t+k = 0 for k = 0; 1; 2; :::Equivalently, by following rule (6) from period t onward the central bank supports a constant interest rate policy i t+k = i for k = 0; 1; 2; :::.for any interest rate i 0 of its choice.
The equilibrium dynamics under (6) from period t onward are described by (2), which we rewrite here in terms deviations from means as
together with
The previous equilibrium conditions can be obtained by combining (3) with (6), together with the de…nition of the output gap and our assumption on the process followed by y n t . Equivalently, and more compactly, we have 2
for k = 0; 1; 2; :: and where Given that the system (10) involves two non-predetermined and one predetermined variables, it has a unique non-explosive solution if and only if two eigenvalues of A lie inside, and one outside, the unit circle. The following proposition establishes a necessary and su¢ cient condition for that property to hold. . Using the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 1 we conclude that both 1 and 2 are real, and satisfy the inequality 0 < 1 < 1 < 3 . Thus, as long as > 1, two eigenvalues of A lie inside, and one outside, the unit circle. QED.
Next we show how CIR projections can be computed. We note …rst that under the CIR rule we must have b t+k + y t+k = 0 or, equivalently,
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::
8
Substituting the previous expression into (8) we obtain, after some algebraic manipulation, the second order di¤erence equation
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::where a Combining (11) and (12) we can obtain the stationary solution for in ‡a-tion under the unchanged interest rate policy
More compactly,
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::where
Note that the equilibrium dynamics of in ‡ation and the output gap are independent of the particular choice of coe¢ cient by the monetary authority, as long as > 1.
Let E t f t+k jig and E t fx t+k jig denote the CIR projection for in ‡ation and the output gap, at a k-period horizon, given the constant interest rate i 0. Iterating over (13) we obtain
and where i and x 1 (1 )(i ) are the steady state values of in ‡ation and the output gap consistent with a constant interest i. The previous expression makes it clear that the CIR projections are well de…ned and unique, for any horizon k 0.
More generally, one can show that the equilibrium of the basic New Keynesian model considered here will be determinate if the central bank follows an interest rate rule of the form
as long as > 1, i.e. as long as the central bank adjusts the interest rate more than one-for-one in response to changes in in ‡ation, thus satisfying the so-called Taylor principle. Rule (6) is a particular case of (14) corresponding to = , and for which the implied nominal rate remains constant in equilibrium, as shown above. One should emphasize, however, that it is important for the central bank to make its policy rule transparent, for it is the public's perception that the central bank will respond to in ‡ation ‡uctuations that makes the equilibrium determinate.
Summary and Caveats
The present paper has shown, in the context of a baseline New Keynesian model, the possibility of pursuing a monetary policy characterized by a constant nominal interest rate, without that policy leading to a multiplicity of equilibria. The existence of a unique equilibrium associated with any given constant nominal rate makes it possible to construct forecasts of any variable conditional on a given choice of that rate, i.e. constant interest rate (CIR) projections. Thus, our analysis provides a counterexample to concerns often found in the literature about the feasibility of those projections. Those concerns are expressed on the grounds that in a variety of forward-looking models (including the one used here) constant interest rate policies are associated with an indeterminate equilibrium and, hence, with the lack of a well de…ned projection of any macroeconomic variable conditional on a given constant level of the interest rate.
Of course, solving the problem of indeterminacy does not automatically make CIR projections desirable as a tool to help inform policy decisions. A discussion of their potential usefulness, however, falls beyond the scope of the present paper, which has focused on the narrower issue of whether they are well de…ned at all. But there is one feature that may be worth pointing out, and that would seem to make those CIR projections unappealing at least to an in ‡ation targeting central bank: in most monetary models there is generally only one level of the nominal interest rate that is consistent with a given long-run in ‡ation target, so it is not clear why the central bank would want to consider the implications of policies involving a constant interest rate path at a level di¤erent from the one consistent with the desired target for in ‡ation. A possible response to that concern is that in practice a central bank would never intend to keep the nominal rate constant forever (at whichever level is being considered), but only for a …nite amount of time (e.g. until the reference horizon for the projections), and then revert back to some rule that would be consistent with the desired in ‡ation target.
But it should be clear that, in a forward-looking model, neither current nor projected outcomes will be invariant to the speci…c rule to which the central bank is assumed to revert at some point in the future, even if the latter is not expected to be in place until after the horizon date for the projections. Hence, the speci…cation of a constant interest rate path would have to be supplemented with a description of the rule that will eventually replace it and a speci…cation of the timing of that replacement. Needless to say, the introduction of policy switches of that kind could complicate the analysis considerably, but it would lead to CIR projections consistent with an unchanged long-run in ‡ation target.
